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The polemic between
Leonard Nelson and Ernst Cassirer
on the critical method in the philosophy*
Abstract: The subject of the paper is a polemic between Leonard Nelson and Ernst
Cassirer mainly concerning the understanding of the critical method in philosophy.
Nelson refutes the accusation of psychologism and attacks the core of the philosophy
of the Marburg School of Neo-Kantianism. In response to those allegations, Cassirer
feels obliged to defend the position of his masters and performs this task brilliantly.
The present paper considers similarities and differences in the positions of both
sides in this debate. I try to evaluate the arguments of both sides and argue that
they took basically the same positions, while the existing discrepancies did not jus-
tify such an intense polemic. If the disputing sides had approached the discussion in
a less emotional way, it could have led to substantive and interesting conclusions.
Keywords: Leonard Nelson, Ernst Cassirer, Marburg School, Neo-Kantianism, criti-
cal method
Nelson was known in Germany for rediscovering the philosophy of
Fries.1 This was caused by the confrontation between Nelson and
Cassirer, who were representatives of the Marburg School of
Neo-Kantianism. An important point in this debate was Nelson’s
sharp critique of this School in his texts Die kritische Methode und
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das Verhältnis der Psychologie zur Philosophie (1904) and Jakob
Friedrich Fries und seine jüngsten Kritiker (1905).2 Nelson’s review
of Cohen’s book Logik der reinen Erkenntnis (1902) provoked
Cassirer to face this criticism in his work Der kritische Idealismus
und die Philosophie des „gesunden Menschenverstandes” (1906).3
Cassirer and Nelson levelled a number of accusations at each other’s
views and raised a fundamental question about the Kantianism of
their philosophical approaches, in particular concerning the under-
standing of the critical method. The discussion between Nelson and
Cassirer of the notion of critical method affects many aspects and
should be treated as a debate in which two different directions
within the framework of Neo-Kantianism were confronted. So,
mainly we have to deal with a discussion on the critical method be-
tween two Neo-Kantian directions, that is, between the Marburg
School and the Neo-Friesian School.
This dispute between Nelson and the Marburg School had a sig-
nificant influence on his academic career. His treatise Die kritische
Methode und das Verhältnis der Psychologie zur Philosophie, in
which he attempts to develop the psychology of introspection as the
final source of knowledge regarding the doctrine of Fries, was re-
jected many times because of his criticism and the intransigence of
Cohen’s philosophy: twice promoted as a doctoral thesis (in 1902/03
in Berlin and in 1903/04 in Göttingen) and later in 1906 as a habili-
tation thesis in Göttingen.4 Nelson first tried to gain a doctoral de-
gree with his treatise on the critical method in Berlin with Carl
Stumpf and then he undertook the second attempt at the end of the
winter semester 1903/04 in Göttingen. His book Jakob Friedrich
Fries und seine jüngsten Kritiker (1904), concentrating on the
so-called Kant-Friesian problem, was accepted as a dissertation by
Julius Baumann, and Nelson took an oral examination on the 29th of
July 1904. Nelson’s sharp, critical, and uncompromising approach
negatively affected his scholarly career, especially after 1905, when
his polemic against Cohen was published in the “Göttingschen
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3 E. Cassirer: Der kritische Idealismus und die Philosophie des »gesunden
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melte Werke, vol. 9, Hamburger Ausgabe, Darmstadt 2004, pp. 3—36; H. Cohen: Sys-
tem der Philosophie. Theil 1: Logik der reinen Erkenntnis. Berlin 1902.
4 T. Kononowicz, P. Waszczenko: Wstęp. In: O sztuce filozofowania. Kraków 1994,
p. 9.
gelehrten Anzeigen”. There he accused Cohen of lacking knowledge
of Kant’s philosophy and the dogmatism of the pre-Kantian philoso-
phy.5 The rejection of his book on the critical method as his habilita-
tion thesis is thus hardly surprising. Eventually, Nelson earned
a professorial position in 1908 with his work Untersuchungen zur
Entwicklungsgeschichte der Kantischen Erkenntnistheorie, in which
he expressed appreciation of the Göttingen scholars and mathemati-
cians at the Science of Nature Faculty of the University of
Göttingen.6 The habilitation brought little change to his academic ca-
reer since it was not until eleven years later, in June 1919, that he
was appointed associate professor in Göttingen and nominated for
the position of Georg Misch — after Hilbert’s intervention. This nom-
ination triggered Nelson’s dispute with Edmund Husserl, who had
come into conflict with Göttingen mathematicians.
The main goal of Cassirer’s essay Der kritische Idealismus… is to
explore Nelson’s attacks presented in his treatise Die kritische
Methode… . In this regard, Cassirer makes the following allegation
against Nelson:
Sein Stil trägt überall dem Tagesgeschmack Rechnung, den seine
Philosophie zu bekämpfen behauptet. Nicht in ruhiger und sach-
licher Erörterung werden die Grundlagen der Friesschen Lehre
vor uns klargelegt, sondern immer wieder lenkt die Betrachtung
zu polemischen Exkursen ab und ergeht sich in pathetischen Be-
teuerungen oder Angriffen. Die Art, in der Nelson die Gegner der
Friesschen Auffassung abzufertigen sucht, kann nur zur Verwir-
rung, nicht zur Klärung des eigentlichen Streitpunktes dienen.
Nirgends gönnt er ihnen eine klare und zusammenfassende Dar-
stellung ihrer Ansicht; immer von neuem unterbricht er sein Re-
ferat mit höhnischen Glossen und Zwischenbemerkungen.7
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son: Rezension von Hermann Cohen: System der Philosophie. 1. Teil: Logik der reinen
Erkenntnis. In: Gesammelte Schriften. vol. 2, 1973, pp. 1—27; Cf. auch Helmut
Holzhey, ed., 98. Natorp an Görland. In: Cohen und Natorp. Der Marburger Neukan-
tianismus in Quellen. Zeugnisse kritischer Lektüre, Briefe der Marburger, Dokumente
zur Philosophiepolitik der Schule. Vol. 2. Basel/Stuttgart 1986.
6 L. Nelson, Untersuchungen zur Entwicklungsgeschichte der Kantischen Er-
kenntnistheorie. “Abhandlungen der Fries’schen Schule. Neue Folge” (3), no 1 1912,
pp. 33—96; L. Nelson: Untersuchungen zur Entwicklungsgeschichte der Kantischen
Erkenntnistheorie. “Gesammelte Schriften” (2) 1973, pp. 404—457.
7 E. Cassirer: Der kritische Idealismus…, p. 4.
The objective of this contentious polemic is to show the essence of
Nelson’s philosophy, which would allow a proper evaluation of its im-
portance and position in the history of philosophy. After recapitulat-
ing Nelson’s theory, Cassirer makes his negative judgment. The rea-
son for Cassirer’s frustration is located in his belief that philosophy
as well as the critique of knowledge is put „in place of blind faith to
justify the principles” that should be exhibited not only empirically,
but in their necessity and objective validity as the logical principles.8
Nelson’s Allegations
The confrontation concerns the method of critical philosophy and
the distinction between dogmatic and critical forebears, which is the
essence of Neo-Kantian philosophy. It is shown by Nelson in the follo-
wing way:
Nennen wir danach dogmatisch das Verfahren einer Wissen-
schaft, die von der Aufstellung ihrer Prinzipien ausgeht, kritisch
das Verfahren einer Wissenschaft, die auch ihre Prinzipien einer
Prüfung unterwirft, so werden wir sagen können, daß für die
Philosophie alles auf ein kritisches Verfahren ankomme und daß
der Kritizismus in der Philosophie in der Befolgung der regressi-
ven und daß der Kritizismus in der Philosophie in der Befolgung
der regressiven Methoden besehe.9
The examination of the principles at the beginning demonstrates
very clearly the relationship between Neo-Kantianism and Nelson’s
position because every Neo-Kantian must accept Kant’s distinction
between dogmatic and critical forebears. Already at the beginning of
the investigation, Nelson finds in relation to Kant’s Critique of Pure
Reason that he understands “under the critique of the reason the
proof of metaphysical judgments on the grounds of their possibil-
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Bänden: Die Schule der kritischen Philosophie und ihre Methode. Vol. 1. Hamburg
1970, p. 14.
ity.”10 This motif of examining the known truths is very much a rep-
etition of his earlier claims,11 so it cannot be called accidental, but
must be regarded as essential.
The difference between Nelson and Cassirer lies in the under-
standing of the critical method of philosophy that must presuppose
a regressive method regarding Fries and Appelt. Nelson’s concept of
critical method is rooted in his understanding of philosophy as the
controversy over abstract principles. It shows traces of philosophical
principles characteristic of the regressive method, often unconscious
and prerequisite in the present judgments and assessments. It is all
about the abstracting process: not the inference of consequences from
their reasons but, conversely, the inference from the consequences to
the reasons for the principles.12 The evidence does show by inference
that a thesis or a theorem is correct based on the principles
adopted.13 The regressive process serves the transformation of dark-
ness based on our judgments and assessments into clear and con-
scious outspoken principles. Nelson finds this process relatively easy
in a view founded on judgments. The basic problem is that our
knowledge begins only partly with intuition. The task of philosophy
as a science lies in the finding of this pure spring of concepts and
principles of their collection from their original darkness to clarity of
consciousness. Without the fulfilment of this task through regressive
study, philosophy falls into the “arbitrariness of dogmatic metaphys-
ics.”
In his understanding of the regressive method, Nelson refers to
a non-intuitive direct knowledge based on metaphysical judgments.14
Nelson’s concept of non-intuitive immediate knowledge as the basis
of all metaphysics goes even further when connecting the dispute
over error and truth only with indirect knowledge of reflection: “All
error and doubt belongs to the reflection and cannot touch the intu-
ition.”15 The principle of immediate knowledge is not excluded by
Nelson from critical examination. Nelson’s principle of immediate
knowledge is an uncritical, even dogmatic, point in his philosophy,
when he concludes:
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12 L. Nelson: Die kritische Methode…, p. 12.
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Aber wir waren bisher der Meinung, daß die Philosophie, daß
insbesondere die Erkenntniskritik die Aufgabe hätte, an Stelle
des blinden Glaubens die Rechtfertigung der Prinzipien zu set-
zen, daß sie nicht nur die tatsächliche empirische Anwendung
der logischen Grundsätze aufzuweisen, sondern auch deren Not-
wendigkeit und objektive Gültigkeit darzutun hätte. Jetzt sehen
wir, daß ebendiese Ansicht das Vorurteil ist, das uns von der un-
befangenen Würdigung des Nelsonschen »Standpunktes« noch
trennt.16
The acceptance of immediate knowledge by Nelson disappointed
Cassirer, for whom critical philosophy was to justify the task rather
than the principles of blind faith.
Nelson meant, as did Fries and Meyer, that psychologically under-
stood deduction must be regarded as the essence of Kant’s philoso-
phy.17 For this reason, the deduction of metaphysical principles was
strictly connected with its psychology. This psychology is concerned
with perception as one of two basic sources of knowledge. The pri-
macy of intuition in opposition to the reflection is that intuition — in
Nelson’s opinion — can never be untrue. In connection with this
point, Cassirer showed a contradiction in Nelson’s idea.
On the misunderstood concept of deduction, Nelson says of Fries’
reproach concerning the „prejudice of the transcendental” that „the
fundamental mistake of the whole Post-Kantian dogmatism” lies in
„mixing psychological and philosophical principles.”18 Nelson consid-
ers the transcendental critique as an empirical science with a priori
knowledge of the object. So, we have to distinguish precisely between
the object and the content of transcendental criticism because they
are dissimilar: The object of criticism is philosophical knowledge as
a kind of a priori knowledge, and its content remains transcendental
knowledge, which has a psychological character. Transcendental
means a kind of metaphilosophical knowledge that, in contrast to the
a priori knowledge of philosophy itself, can only be known a posteri-
ori in the inner experience.
This disapproval of the wrongly understood criticism by the
Post-Kantian was the real reason for Cassirer’s reaction because Nel-
son relates it directly to Cohen’s Kants Theorie der Erfahrung.19 Nel-
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son opposes the metaphysical antipsychologism of the Marburg
School, because it did not disconnect the transcendental deduction
from the evidence. Nelson’s provision is very strong, while he refers
directly to “the correct understanding and a healthy development of
the critical philosophy.” In recognition that the transcendental inves-
tigation of a priori knowledge can be only a priori, so that the “tran-
scendental investigation of the reason for the possibility of the a pri-
ori knowledge” should itself be the reason for their ability, Nelson
finds “the confusion of the psychological reasons for the criticism
with the logical reasons for the system.”20 In connection thereto, Nel-
son asks the fundamental question of the possibility of such an idea
of a priori knowledge without basing it on direct knowledge. It is ob-
vious that Cassirer, as a conscious successor of the Marburg School,
opposed and objected to this negative image.
Nelson’s criticism was designed to be a world view, such as ideal-
ism or materialism, but as a method it opposes dogmatism and scep-
ticism in the following way: “The criticism is meant as a method and
not a philosophical system.”21 This methodological criticism is de-
fined by him as opposed to the results of the critical method. How-
ever, one may have doubts about his definition when he shows the
difference between criticism and dogmatism on objective grounds in
the evidence or in comparison with the objects of the truth of philo-
sophical knowledge. In this connection, Cassirer attacked Nelson’s
concept of criticism as not critical.
In this context, we should consider Nelson’s uncompromising criti-
cism of Cohen’s logic, published by him in the “Göttingschen
gelehrten Anzeigen” as the review of Cohen’s Logik der reinen
Erkenntnis.22 His review already includes the following assessment:
“In fact the reader will be disappointed of this titled as Logic of Pure
Knowledge book if he expected something like this, which the edu-
cated humanity of Aristotle to Kant has referred as a logic.”23 So,
Nelson reveals his negative position — without any semblance of im-
partiality — that Cohen’s thinking has a mystical character. His in-
terpretation of Cohen’s logic of pure reason can by no means be de-
scribed as well-intentioned, because it assumes the negative
intention of the author in advance.
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At the centre of Nelson’s criticism is Cohen’s principle of the
infinitesimal method of his logic. It is Nelson’s comparison with the
results of the mathematical sciences that shows the notion of an infi-
nitely small size was precisely defined by mathematics as
non-existing in some mystical sense.24 In contrast to the results of
mathematical research, this exactness in Cohen’s reflections does not
suggest its meaning was changed within the logic of pure knowledge;
Nelson expresses it as follows:
Die eigene Ansicht des Verfassers [Cohens — T.K.] läuft darauf
hinaus, daß dem Unendlichkleinen nicht nur eine selbständige
Bedeutung und Existenz zukommen soll, sondern daß in ihm
sogar das Ursprungs- und Erzeugungsprinzip für das Endliche
liegt.25
Nelson thus reproaches Cohen for applying a non-mathematical
meaning to the notion of infinitely small, which changes its meaning
in an important way when it is considered to exist as something. To
justify this accusation, Nelson refers to selected fragments of Cohen’s
book, such as “Folglich ist das Unendlichkleine als Realität
auszuzeichnen,” where the author allegedly explicitly mentions the re-
ality of infinitely small size. However, this is not what Cohen origi-
nally claimed. For this reason, Nelson’s conviction of the infinitely
small as a realistic view of Cohen’s concept should be assessed as
groundless; it is just a misinterpretation that cannot be justified in
the context of the doctrine of the Marburg School. The reason for this
misinterpretation can be explained in the strict context of the Logik
der reinen Erkenntnis, in which Cohen very clearly states the negative
view of the number as the real thing.26 The number is not a real ob-
ject, but a real reference point for the knowledge, with which Nelson,
based on the assumption of epistemological impossibility, could not
agree. In this sense, the reality is referred to merely as a specific re-
quirement and direction of pure thinking, exaggerated by empiricism
to become the main principle of epistemology. It is self-evident and
does not contain any contradiction that the idealist epistemology of
the Marburg School would want to explain in relation to the so-called
‘real’ reality, and Nelson shows much malevolence in his misreading.
Nelson refers negatively to Cohen’s development of Kant’s system
and calls it a „relapse into dogmatic ontology” of Reinhold and Fich-
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te.27 Here we can see that the basis of the dispute between Nelson and
the Marburg School are the other traditions of Kantianism; Nelson
philosophizes in connection with Fries’ interpretation of Kant’s doctri-
ne against Cohen as well as Cassirer in this direction of the Kantian
philosophy, as initiated by Reinhold and Fichte, among others.
This division has its implications in the Kantian doctrine of the
distinction between analytic and synthetic judgments that consti-
tutes the core of Kant’s Kritik der reinen Vernunft, because it forms
a fundamental border between logic and metaphysics. For this rea-
son, Kant must be of great significance for Cohen’s logic of pure
knowledge. Here we see an important distinction between two philos-
ophers that makes, in Nelson’s opinion, “the whole undertaking of
Cohen’s logic to naught.”28 The pulling down of the barriers between
logic and metaphysics leads to the Hegelian doctrine of incomplete-
ness and further variability of terms, which Nelson summarizes in
the following way:
Kurz, wir befinden uns mitten in der Hegelschen Ontologie, nur
daß hier an die Stelle des dialektischen Umschlagens der Begriffe
die Erzeugung derselben aus dem Nichts vermöge der infinitesi-
malen Kontinuität gesetzt ist. Dies ist das folgerichtige Ende des
mißverstandenen Kantianismus, der sich in ihm selbst richtet.29
This summary shows very clearly that Nelson’s confrontation with
the Kantian Criticism of Cohen has its actual source in the separa-
tion between the two Neo-Kantian schools. Nelson did not under-
stand the dynamic conception of the term of the Marburg school be-
cause he did not want to acknowledge it.
Cassirer’s Defence
Cassirer protested that Nelson underappreciated the modern de-
velopment of the issues of immediate and non-intuitive principles of
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27 Cf. L. Nelson: Rezension von Hermann Cohen: System der Philosophie…,
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28 Ibid., p. 26.
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metaphysics as in the teaching of Descartes, who had just talked
about the criterion of “clear and distinct perception” as the supreme
principle of all certainty. Intuition is not a sufficient reason for these
truths, but only to the “clear and distinct concepts of our minds.” In
this way, metaphysical concepts, such as an idea of God, are referred
to as the content and products of pure reason, which must not be
generated by immediate apprehension, but by our reflection and
self-conscious thinking. Cassirer relates “The concept of clear and
distinct perception […] to the actual historical and factual crisis of
Cartesian philosophy,” not only for empirical opponents, but also
within rationalism.30 This kind of intuition was abandoned by
empiricists and rationalists in modern epistemology and was just on
the edge of philosophy in the common sense doctrine of the Scottish
school of Thomas Reid and James Beattie as a „last stop and base.”
This is why Cassirer comes to the following conclusion:
Nelson täuscht sich über die wahren geschichtlichen Ursprünge
seines Systems, wenn er sich als Reformator der Friesschen Leh-
re fühlt: Was er in Wahrheit ergriffen und wiederhergestellt hat,
das ist die altbekannte Philosophie des „Common sense“.31
Cassirer has another image of Nelson’s »scheme« of the history. It
is a critique, not of the content of the same theoretical and practical
principles, but of the method of line-up of principles that remained
outdated. Cassirer identifies Nelson’s Neo-Friesianism with the Scot-
tish School and the distinction between intuition and reflection
prompts him to identify Nelson’s concept of intuition with that of
common sense: “What Nelson here intuition calls, this is by Beattie
designated and determined in the conception of »common sense«.”32 If
non-removable intuition has no degrees of probability and uncer-
tainty, as Nelson claimed, it is precisely this fundamental view of the
epistemology put forward by the Scottish School. Nelson’s view on
the history of philosophy subsumes the conviction of the uniqueness
of the critical philosophy of the trio Kant-Fries-Apelt and is not
based on the history of philosophy.
62 Tomasz Kubalica
30 E. Cassirer: Der kritische Idealismus…, p. 15; cf. E. Cassirer: Das Erkenntni-
sproblem in der Philosophie und Wissenschaft der neueren Zeit. In: Das Erkenntni-
sproblem in der Philosophie und Wissenschaft der neueren Zeit, Gesammelte Werke.
Vol. 2. Hamburger Ausgabe. Darmstadt 2004, Buch 3, Kap. 2.
31 E. Cassirer: Der kritische Idealismus…, p. 16.
32 Ibid., p. 18.
Cassirer also notes Nelson’s misinterpretation in relation to the
Neo-Kantian view on Kant’s Kritik der reinen Vernunft, when Nelson
showed Kant’s fundamental error in the reflection and trial of tran-
scendental proof of the metaphysical principles. In Cassirer’s opinion,
Nelson brought Kant’s critique of reason to its true centre and incon-
sistently recognized it as the basis of true philosophy.33 The basic lack
of the critique of reason is the disregard for the immediate knowledge
of reason, on which intellect can be based and form synthetic a priori
judgments. Kant tried in vain to find truthfulness of the reflection it-
self through the analytic relationship between the experience and its
more fundamental principles. Nelson acknowledged the possibility of
deriving direct certain knowledge of reason from pure concepts in the
sense of the Cartesian innate natural light of rationalism of the
Leibniz-Wolff School.34 This was seen by Cassirer as an uncritical, and
even dogmatic, interpretation of Kant’s doctrine. According to the
Marburg School, Kant’s deduction can only come from the concept of
the possibility of the experience and cannot proceed from the mere
“psychological demonstration of a sentence in the inner observation,”
as Nelson wanted. Here we see the focus of the dispute between the
two Neo-Kantian directions. With this background, Cassirer refutes
Nelson’s conception of Kant’s doctrine.35 Thus, Cassirer has the right
to own the interpretation of Kant’s legacy as disputed by Nelson in the
other sense as a Marburger interpretation, which is consistent with
the typical Neo-Kantian heterodox understanding of Kant’s Critique.
Cassirer’s emotional response only justifies Nelson’s brutal attack on
the philosophical basis of his school.
Cassirer questions the interpretation of Kant’s theory further and
asks about the concept of regressive method in view of the principle
of the conservation of energy by Nelson, deciding on the nature of
Nelson’s philosophical critique.36 Cassirer doubts that Nelson, or
even some naturalists, really could assure the truth of the energy
principle in the direct psychological view of “inner experience.”
Cassirer believes that Nelson’s regressive method, contrary to his in-
tention, leads to empiricism with his sensualistic interpretation of
the principles and criticisms against the a priori character of persis-
tence because he cannot show the priority of the inner over the ex-
ternal experience in a methodological way.37 To achieve and take pos-
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session of basic psychological facts, we need the abstraction that still
proceeds from data given to us by inner experience. These change-
able realities must be processed through abstraction and the result
of this process has only “conditional and hypothetical validity.”38 If
criticism should consist of generally valid and necessary sentences, it
must arise from criticism of the system, although these requirements
are met by Nelson. In connection with Nelson's rejection, the proof of
metaphysical propositions loses its meaning. The certainty of each
philosophical principle, therefore, depends on the respective state of
empirical science, and every principle so far kept as irrevocable has
“only a certain degree of probability and has to be corrected by fu-
ture experience at any time.”39 This is why Cassirer believes that, in
contrast to Fries’ and Apelt’s derivation of metaphysical principles,
Nelson does not see security and completeness because he rejects the
Kantian table of judgments for its incompleteness and non-necessity.
Nelson does not propose any alternative solution and that is why “in
truth all randomness of »introspection« remains and propels without
control on the vast seas of »inner experience«.”40 In this connection,
Cassirer criticizes Nelson’s concept of the critique for its
instrumentalization.41
Nelson’s view is based on his interpretation of Kant’s fundamen-
tal problem of the object being accessible only by »inner experience«
in the process of thinking and not of the conditions of the empirical
object itself.42 Cassirer is of the opinion that such a conception of the
“boundary between the subjective and objective proofs” blurs and,
thus, leads to a tautology in dealing with the basic problem of philos-
ophy: “the material to which all scientific and philosophical research
refers is only in contents of consciousness.”43 The consequence is
a co-ordination of all scientific and philosophical disciplines that does
not take into account their specific character and, in particular, their
method or procedures.44 The determination of consciousness as a per-
manent and unchanging feature of any science and philosophy is tau-
tological in relation to the object of knowledge and should be re-
garded as fruitless and unavailing. The subject is one of two
reference points of the knowledge relationship and rather important
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43 E. Cassirer: Der kritische Idealismus…, p. 32.
44 Cf. Ibid.
in determining this relationship. In this determination of tautology
as the starting point, Cassirer is of course right. We can argue
whether it is a successful defence against the allegation of the im-
possibility of the epistemology: although Cassirer criticizes Nelson
because of the ambiguity of his proofs of impossibility, he presents
no systematic analysis of his arguments.
Irrespective of this, Cassirer’s criticism of the tautology in consid-
ering inner experience as the basis of metaphysical principles is
valid, because it exposes the error of the Idem per Idem, that is,
a circular definition with the definiens repeating literally, directly or
indirectly the definiendum. This is no definition at all. Rather, it is
a logical triviality of Nelson’s statement, which refers to a very sim-
ple structure of the proof in the medieval concept of trivium curricu-
lum. However, the charge of tautology levelled against Nelson’s triv-
ial statement, justified as it might be, cannot explain the composite
character and diversity of science.
Conclusion
In his article, Cassirer defended the doctrine of his master,
Hermann Cohen, against Nelson’s criticism of Logik der reinen
Erkenntnis.45 The controversy concerns the concept of infinite size,
which is a prerequisite and intellectual condition of reality in the sci-
entific sense. Nelson opposed Cohen’s view that infinitely small size
may not mean the existence of infinitely small quantities in a mathe-
matically definable meaning and that no originating and generating
principle could be meant for the finite. Cassirer accused Nelson of
misreading Cohen’s doctrine. He pointed out that Cohen pursued the
way of the true founders of analysis of the infinite, such as Leibniz,
Newton, Euler, and MacLaurin, who actually thought of the concept
of infinitely small size only as methods. Thus, Cohen blocked the
hypostatization to things existing by themselves and Nelson misin-
terpreted as self-evident that “das Infinitesimale nicht als Ding,
sondern als Bedingung, nicht als eine irgendwie vorhandene
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Wirklichkeit, sondern als ein gedankliches Instrument zur
Entdeckung und zum Aufbau des wahrhaften Seins zu gelten
habe.”46 Cassirer protested that Nelson’s misinterpretation was con-
trary to the proper intention of Cohen’s concept of the infinitely
small. Cohen did not posit the existence of infinitely small things so
that they could be understood as metaphysical realities. This conclu-
sion would be in contradiction to the anti-metaphysical thought of
the Marburg School. Regarding Nelson’s review, Cassirer came to
the following conclusion:
Außer diesem Einwand gegen das Infinitesimale aber, dem sich,
so verkehrt er ist, doch allenfalls noch ein sachlicher Sinn abge-
winnen läßt, findet sich in der ganzen langen Kritik Nelsons
auch nicht ein einziges positives Argument. Was übrigbleibt, sind
einzig und allein gehässige Entstellungen und Schmähungen.
Keinem Begriff wird die feste terminologische Bedeutung, kei-
nem Gedanken der innere sachliche Zusammenhang gelassen,
die sie innerhalb der »Logik der reinen Erkenntnis« besitzen;
überall werden nur einzelne Sätze herausgerissen, um sie mit
höhnischen Randbemerkungen zu versehen.47
In this context, it should be said that Cassirer’s rejection of Nel-
son’s allegations was in principle correct, but the adversaries went
about it the wrong way: an interesting philosophical confrontation
between two Neo-Kantian directions could have provided many im-
portant conclusions. Unfortunately, its participants did not rise to
the task, so their discussion only generated worse misinterpretations
and from the impartial observer’s viewpoint must be disapproved.
The polemic between Nelson and Cassirer refers in fact to the es-
sence of Neo-Kantianism and includes the question of its narrow and
broader sense. It is very difficult to determine the extent of the term
Neo-Kantianism. These difficulties show in textbooks on the history
of philosophy, classifying Nelson’s philosophy differently. According to
some authors, he belongs to a specific variant of Neo-Kantianism,
but others exclude him with his Neo-Friesian School from this philo-
sophical tradition. As for Cassirer, compared with other historians of
philosophy, he understands the Neo-Kantian very narrowly, as in his
essay on Neo-Kantianism in the Encyclopaedia Britannica from
1946.48 However, not all historians of philosophy agree with Cassirer.
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Traugott Konstantin Österreich, who formed the widely accepted
classification of Neo-Kantianism, presented in the twelfth edition of
the Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie of Überweg (1923), con-
siders Nelson along with his Neu-Friesianische School to represent
psychologically oriented Neo-Kantianism.49 Nowadays, Nelson is un-
derstood in a similar way by Andrzej J. Noras as well as Tadeusz
Gadacz.50 Based on this discussion about Nelson’s affiliation to
Neo-Kantianism, we can perceive the main positions on the essence
of the critical method.
Nelson accused not only Cohen of the underestimation of Fries’
philosophy, but also Kuno Fischer, Wilhelm Windelband, and Alois
Riehl.51 His ‘hypercriticism’ shows, on the one hand, his aspiration to
search for the truth; however, on the other hand, he appears quite
blind to the benefits of other kinds of Neo-Kantian philosophies. Nel-
son’s irrational attacks on prominent Neo-Kantians, like Cohen,
Windelband, and Riehl, contributed to the marginalization of his phi-
losophy.52 Nelson criticized them for their acknowledgment of “preju-
dice of the transcendental.” However, with his uncritically expressed
criticism, he himself contributed to his own marginalization and was
forgotten. Despite his distance from the Neo-Kantians, he belongs to
this formation because membership is not a matter of the suggested
solutions, but rather of the problem. The polemic between Cassirer
and Nelson demonstrates this common problem and, at the same
time, the differences in the proposed solutions. However, these differ-
ences are normal in the context of broadly and narrowly defined
Neo-Kantianism.
It should be stated that this polemic between Nelson and the
Marburg School was aimless because despite the sharp criticism of
Cohen, Nelson’s philosophy and many philosophical convictions were
held at both Neo-Kantian schools. Such common opinions belonged,
among others, to Platonism, moderate scientism or criticism of the
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1946, pp. 215—216; cf. H. Oberer: Transzendentalsphäre und konkrete Subjektivität.
Ein zentrales Thema der neueren Transzendentalphilosophie. In: Materialien zur
Neukantianismus-Diskusion. Ed. H.-L. Ollig. Darmstadt 1987, p. 110; cf. E. von
Aster: Geschichte der Philosophie. Aufl. 2. Stuttgart 1935, p. 370f.
49 Friedrich Überwegs »Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie«. Bd. 4: Die
deutsche Philosophie des 19. Jahrhunderts und der Gegenwart. Ed. T.K. Österreich.
Aufl. 12. Berlin 1923, p. 417.
50 Cf. A.J. Noras: Historia neokantyzmu…, p. 377—392; T. Gadacz: Historia filo-
zofii XX wieku: nurty. Neokantyzm, filozofia egzystencji, filozofia dialogu. T. 2. Kra-
ków 2009, p. 319—359.
51 E. Cassirer: Der kritische Idealismus…, p. 22.
52 A.J. Noras: Historia neokantyzmu…, op. cit., p. 385.
theory of judgment, as in Natorp. Together with Lask, he acknowl-
edged the possibility of immediate knowledge. The difference con-
cerns the concept of the critical method, which was connected with
the transcendental method in the Marburg School and with the re-
gressive method in Nelson. Despite this fundamental difference, it
can be recognized that the tone of his polemics was too strong.53
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